New research led by Sandra J. Geiger and a large team (2025) provides important insights into the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance in the context of climate change and examines the effectiveness of intervention messages based on public consensus. The study, which included participants from 11 countries (Study 1) and secondary data from 55 countries (Study 2), revealing widespread underestimation of societal consensus on climate change and at the same time surprisingly limited effectiveness of simple information campaigns to support climate action.

Ubiquitous Pluralistic Ignorance

Pluralistic ignorance is a psychological phenomenon in which people underestimate the prevalence of majority opinions while overestimating minority opinions. In relation to climate change, this means that although most people believe in human-caused climate change, this public consensus is collectively underestimatedStudy 1 confirmed this in 11 countries where participants consistently underestimated the prevalence of pro-climate views ranging from 7.5% in Indonesia to 20.8% in Brazil. At the same time overestimated the occurrence of skeptical opinions, including those that claim that climate change is not caused by humans or that it is not happening at all. This effect was found across all countries studied, suggesting the broad generalizability of pluralistic ignorance in this context.

The consequences of such misinterpretation are significant. Underestimating pro-climate views can lead to to voluntary silence among those who hold these views, further reinforcing the impression that pro-climate attitudes are not widely shared. It may also hinder support for climate policies and weaken climate action.

Ineffectiveness of Consensus-Based Interventions?

Based on the theory that pluralistic ignorance provides an opportunity for simple and scalable interventions, the authors tested the effectiveness of messages emphasizing the actual public consensus on climate change. However, the results of Study 1 were largely disappointingInformation about the actual public consensus was mostly ineffective, except for a slight increase in willingness to express a pro-climate opinion. This effect was small (Cohen's δ = 0.05), but potentially significant due to its self-amplifying nature and the scalability of the intervention.

However, the intervention did not have a robust effect on any of the other outcomes monitoredIt did not affect personal willingness to change lifestyles, support for government climate action, or expectations about the willingness of others to make changes. There was also no effect on beliefs about collective efficacy (i.e. whether a country's citizens can collectively prevent the negative consequences of climate change).

The authors offer several possible explanations for this limited effectiveness:

1. Insufficient update of perceived consensus: Although a follow-up study in Brazil showed that participants slightly updated their perceptions of public consensus after the intervention, this may not be true for all countries.
2. Using real data: Past research has often used fictitious, more optimistic data that may have exaggerated the effectiveness of the messages. Using real data may lead to less dramatic but more realistic results.
3. The distance between the message and the results: The report emphasized beliefs about climate change, not direct action. Reports that focus directly on action might be more effective in inciting climate action, although this could be counterproductive in contexts where climate action is not common.

Cultural Context and Pluralistic Ignorance

Study 2 examined whether cultural “tightness-looseness” influences pluralistic ignorance. Free cultures are characterized by more ambiguous social norms and greater tolerance for norm violations, which may lead to skeptical minorities being more vocal in expressing their opinions, thereby contributing to pluralistic ignorance. It has been hypothesized that pluralistic ignorance might be more pronounced in freer cultures.

Indeed, exploratory analyses in Study 2, which included data from 55 countries, showed that Pluralistic ignorance was more pronounced in freer cultures compared to tighter cultures, when actual social norms were controlled for. For example, a one-degree increase in freedom (such as the difference between Algeria and Hungary) was associated with approximately 3 percentage points greater pluralistic ignorance. This pattern, while exploratory and requiring further replication, suggests that pluralistic ignorance is not simply a matter of numerical perception but is also related to broader sociocultural factors.

Limitations and Future Challenges

The authors acknowledge several limitations. The limited number of countries in Study 1 did not allow for a more detailed examination of whether interventions are differentially effective in tighter and looser cultures. The use of cross-quota samples in Study 1 (based on age and gender) may limit the generalizability of findings to urban and highly educated populations, although data were weighted to match national parameters. The intervention design was also limited by existing data, suggesting the need to develop more targeted and relevant reports of public consensus. Finally, Study 2 focused only on cultural tightness-looseness at the country level, and future research could consider regional differences within larger countries.

Research by Geiger et al. (2025) confirms the general tendency of people to underestimate the pro-climate views of others, which is especially pronounced in freer cultures. Although pluralistic ignorance is widespread, Raising awareness of the broad public consensus on human-caused climate change has not supported climate action in addition to individuals’ willingness to express their pro-climate views. These findings have key implications for climate change communication, suggesting that a more nuanced and targeted approach that goes beyond simply communicating existing consensus is needed to effectively galvanize action. JRi

The study was published in the journal journals.sagepub.com